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Preamble 
 
The theme of this conference is the ‘Unity of Science’. Let me explici-
tate how I interpret this interesting motto. For me this does not mean 
that there is one regina scientiarum that domineers over the other fields 
of science and learning; a role that was allotted to theology in the old 
times, and that nowadays - in a more secular vein – is claimed by phys-
ics at times. In my view the notion ‘unity of science’ rather refers to 
‘communality within diversity’. Disciplines vary in content, issues and 
methods. But there are also quite some common objectives, interests 
and concerns, the most important of which may be the common goal of 
searching for testable truth with objective and independent evidence. 
The communalities render it possible, or even imperative, to communi-
cate and to cooperate. The diversity implies complementarity and calls 
for interdisciplinarity in the study of the many to-day’s complex phe-
nomena in science and society. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Modern societies are facing striking and often disturbing changes and 
challenges. The internationalisation of political strategies, the globalisa-
tion of industry and trade, national populations’ increasing heterogene-
ity and the problematic effects this has on minorities and on social co-
hesion, are only some of them. Further, they have to cope with demo-
graphic changes, particularly with respect to the (future) age distribu-
tion. Not only will this have an effect on the country’s economy, and on 
tax and insurance policies, there will also be an increasing demand for 
education permanente, for suitable employment for older workers, and 
for proper care for elderly people who will increasingly require (often 
advanced) medical services. Simultaneously, lifestyles will change with 
different modes and schedules of working being required besides an 
                                                 
∗
 Past President (2000 – 2006) and Honorary President of ALLEA 
#
 Address to the IAP Conference 'The Unity of Science', Alexandria, Dec.1-3, 2006. 
Article in: ALLEA Annual Report 2007 (pp.23-41). Amsterdam: ALLEA.
 24 
increasing need for leisure activities and travel….. This list can be ex-
tended with many other developments in society and in the lives of 
individual citizens. 
Moreover, a modern society depends, more than ever, on the ad-
vancement of knowledge. Modern society has become a knowledge 
society. And this particularly concerns scientific knowledge. In the 
post-industrial knowledge society, it is especially scientific knowledge 
that has become a salient factor in economical production (see also 
SWR, 2006). The European Commission has also adopted the view that 
knowledge is Europe’s richest resource and that supporting it will be an 
important incentive for Europe’s further cultural and economic devel-
opment (as stated in the proposal for the 7th Framework Programme 
(EC, 2005)). By promoting the European Research Area, this intensi-
fied production of knowledge and the development of high quality 
technology are recognized as crucial for a nation’s economic survival. 
But technological innovation is only successful in a society that is sus-
ceptible to such changes, or, to put it in another way, if the human and 
social factors are sufficiently identified and recognized. Therefore, it 
can be argued that insight into knowledge acquisition and production’s 
processes and the societal factors that further or impede this knowl-
edge’s implementation for technological and industrial innovation is 
vital for the support of a knowledge-intensive society, and, therefore, 
that the social sciences are indispensable in this respect. 
Let us first attempt to briefly define the content and to demarcate the 
domain of what has cursorily been referred to as ‘social sciences’ in the 
above. 
 
 
Definition 
 
One of the first attempts to systematically differentiate within the world 
of sciences was William Craxton’s (1483) suggestion to distinguish two 
kinds of learning: the study of divinity and the study of humanity, thus 
obviously trying to separate the supra-natural and the natural. Some 
hundred years later, Bacon made one further differentiation with his 
proposal to distinguish between natural and human philosophy, besides 
‘divine’ philosophy.  
Natural philosophy has developed into the multiplicity of disciplines 
that we now find under the heading ‘natural sciences’, or, more specifi-
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cally, natural and life sciences. The latter distinction was strongly en-
dorsed by Dawkins (1986) who argued that since dead objects are, in 
his view, principally different from living objects, we need two kinds of 
sciences to study these objects: Physics as the science of the dead, and 
biology as the science of living things.  
With the diminution of theology’s predominance in the 19th century, 
‘divine’ and ‘human’ philosophy later merged into what is called ‘hu-
manities’ in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, ‘letters’ in some other cultures 
and, following Dilthey’s (1883) proposal, Geisteswissenschaften in the 
German language area. This category encompasses a range of disci-
plines, including Classics, History and Archaeology, Linguistics, Arts 
and Literature, Philosophy and Theology.  
The natural sciences have developed a strong experimen-
tal/empirical, or nomothetical, methodology that distinguishes them 
from the humanities’ more descriptive, understanding (Verstehen), 
hermeneutic, or ideographic approach. According to Snow (1959), 
these different orientations have, even developed into two separate, in 
fact, opposed cultures: the alpha (humanities) and the beta (natural sci-
ences) culture. 
At the end of the 19th century, a third player, designated by the term 
‘gamma sciences’, entered the arena. In addition to the study of nature 
and culture, the behaviour of human beings regarding their relation to 
their social environment now became the object of study. The nature 
and development of human cognitive and emotional functions, indi-
viduals’ interactions with other individuals and with their social envi-
ronment, social systems’ structure and dynamics (family, groups, com-
munities and society at large), social systems’ functioning with regard 
to cultural, constitutional, economic and socio/political aspects, all be-
came the object of scientific analysis in various emerging (main) disci-
plines: psychology, sociology, economics and political science. The 
further secession of sub-disciplines, such as demography, criminology, 
cultural anthropology, education studies, management studies and oth-
ers, occurred in the course of the time. 
Within this gamma-science domain (in our discourse indicated as 
social sciences), three relatively separate main streams can be distin-
guished. Firstly the behavioural sciences. They deal with intra- and 
inter-individual behaviour, focusing on the individual. Psychology, 
pedagogic, and educational sciences belong to this category. Then there 
is the group of social sciences that concentrates on the informal and 
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formal social relations between people and the societal institutions in 
which they are embedded: sociology, cultural anthropology, and politi-
cal sciences. We call these societal sciences. And, in the third place, 
there is the group of sciences that deals with the production of wealth, 
the consumption of commodities and the management of states and 
private enterprises’ income and expenditures, the economic sciences. 
These include macro- en microeconomics, econometrics, operational 
research and management. 
In what respect are we dealing with a new and separate scientific 
domain, and can we speak of a ‘third culture’ as, for instance, Lepenies 
(1985) does? What typifies the social sciences? 
In the first place it is, of course, the content of these sciences. As in-
dicated, a variety of problems and issues are studied within the social 
science disciplines, but a common denominator is their focus on the 
functioning of the human being as a social creature. Social sciences 
study the nature of human beings and their behaviour, and the way 
people live together in an informal or institutionalised form. The human 
element is important here, and renders social sciences distinct from 
natural sciences and life sciences. The study of human beings and hu-
man social structures does not only deal with Dawkins’ ‘living things’ 
of biology as opposed to the ‘dead things’ of physics, but with living 
things that have motives, intentions, norms and values, and whose so-
cial institutions have meanings, symbols, rules and rituals, all of which 
are not directly measurable, but have to be inferred from observables. 
Moreover, human beings and their social structures’ developments, 
changes and dynamics are not only caused by external or internal de-
terminable factors, but are also products of their own wilful influence, 
often being illogical, inconsistent and unpredictable. Social sciences 
are, nevertheless, empirical sciences, studying observable phenomena 
with empirical methods, but their insights are more probabilistic than 
deterministic. This is probably why the physicist Kresh once humor-
ously stated that understanding atomic physics is child’s play compared 
with understanding child’s play. 
Secondly - and related to the first point - social scientists use a di-
versity of methods, encompassing both nomothetic and ideographic 
approaches, for their research. Some disciplines, particularly the greater 
part of psychology (experimental psychology, testing and scaling, and 
cognition studies) and a significant part of sociology (empirical sociol-
ogy), and economics (econometrics, and operations research) resemble 
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‘natural sciences’ as far as their use of mathematical techniques and, 
with respect to empirical issues, their rigorous ‘Popperian’ methodol-
ogy are concerned. Other parts of social sciences lean towards the hu-
manities in their descriptive, interpretative and sometimes even herme-
neutic approach. Clinical psychology, cultural anthropology and social 
studies that explore cultural symbols, values and meanings, and dy-
namic social change processes are cases in point. Often a combination 
of the two methodological approaches produces the richest insights. 
Thirdly, the social sciences deal with a reality to which non-
scientists too have access. Journalists, novelists, poets, radio and televi-
sion producers, even gossiping neighbours speak and write about hu-
man motives, desires, needs, and about social and economic factors, 
structures, and developments, often using the same words and concepts 
as social scientists do. Non-scientists have common sense, experience 
and tacit knowledge that are not always easily distinguished from sci-
entific social science knowledge. Consequently, it is sometimes diffi-
cult for social scientists to clearly demarcate scientific from pre-
scientific knowledge, and to convince the general public that knowl-
edge that is embedded in a sound theoretical framework and is evidence 
based, does have an advantage over the layman’s pre-scientific knowl-
edge. 
Fourthly, there is often a close relationship between social sciences 
and societal policy. Social science researchers generally maintain 
strong ties with politics, governments and/or industry. In many coun-
tries, we find that a Social Planning Bureau, or a similar institute that 
offers national or local governments authoritative advice on social poli-
cies, are staffed with social scientists. The majority of psychologists go 
into practice in a clinical, developmental or industrial setting. Econo-
mists are favoured employees in industry, banks and other commercial 
institutes. In many reconnaissance studies and priority programmes in 
social sciences, we see an emphasis on applied, or, at best, strategic 
themes. In other words, social sciences are thought to have a close af-
filiation with practical utilization and policy making, and many of the 
research programmes in the social sciences show a strong inclination 
towards social relevance. It is exactly this last aspect of social sciences 
that will be the subject of further discussion in this paper. 
 
 
 
Article in: ALLEA Annual Report 2007 (pp.23-41). Amsterdam: ALLEA.
 28 
Social sciences as applied sciences? 
 
As we have seen social scientists find themselves, probably more than 
other scientists, in the field of tension between the requirement of find-
ing the scientific truth and that of producing societal relevant insights, 
between truthfulness and usefulness. Let us take a closer look at this 
issue. The distinction pure or basic science versus applied science has 
been a major topic of discussion among science philosophers ever since 
Francis Bacon, in his book Novum Organon, asserted that science is 
only relevant if it aims at societal progress, practical application and 
human control over nature. Opponents maintain that science should be 
autonomous and should follow its own laws and standards with only 
one criterion: veracity. Concessions to practical applicability lead to 
corruption, and, eventually, destruction of science. The difference be-
tween basic and applied social sciences has even been defended as be-
ing rooted in a totally different epistemological tradition: the basic tra-
dition, concerned with scrutinising the essence of things, can be traced 
to the ontological tradition of Plato’s ideas, whereas the applied tradi-
tion stems from everyday common-sense principles and rules as prac-
ticed in the advisory tradition of Aristotle’s politics (cf. Schönpflug, 
1993).  
At present science theorists take a different position. In the first 
place, the distinction between basic and applied research is much less 
clear-cut than has often been suggested. There is a great deal of overlap 
between the two spheres, and many emerging science and technology 
fields (for instance information and cognitive sciences, nanoscience and 
–technology, and bioscience and –technology) contain substantial ele-
ments of both. It is increasingly difficult to identify parts of sciences 
that do not affect technology, or that are not themselves affected by 
technology. EuroScience President Connerade once stated that there are 
only two types of science: applied and not yet applied science. 
In this light, we concur with a proposal by the European Commis-
sion’s expert group on ‘Maximising the wider benefits of competitive 
basic research funding at European level’. In its recent report Frontier 
Research: The European Challenge (EC, 2005b), the group preferred 
the term ‘frontier research’ to the term basic research, to reflect re-
search that creates new knowledge and develops new understanding. 
The group further rejects the traditional distinction between ‘basic’ en 
‘applied’ research which implies that research can be either one or the 
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other, but not both. Researchers engaged in frontier research may well 
simultaneously be concerned with producing new knowledge and with 
generating potentially useful knowledge.  
In the second place, we should not confine ourselves to a strict di-
chotomy of basic science versus applied science. There are different 
nuances and modifications with respect to the criterion of veracity ver-
sus utility, even within the type of research in which veracity remains 
the main determining norm. Let us have a closer look at the spectrum 
between pure and utilised research. 
- Firstly we distinguish pure, science-driven research. Science always 
starts with curiosity, the wish to know the causes of and reasons for 
observables, and the desire to find an explanation for that which is not 
yet understood. In pure and science-driven research, these unanswered 
questions present themselves through experimentation, reflection and 
scientific discussions; they are science generated and conclusion ori-
ented. It is clear that the primary fruits of this pure research are aug-
mentation and enrichment of our knowledge. As such, we deal with an 
independent and indisputable value of science - its intrinsic relevance. 
Fundamental research, be it in physics, biology or psychology, aug-
ments the general body of knowledge, which is an intrinsically valuable 
and precious quality of civilisation, and an essential condition for the 
creation of the next generation of scientists. Through its scientific 
enlightenment of the general public - and this is especially true in re-
spect of the dispersion of social science knowledge – it can further be 
regarded as an important instrument with which to develop and 
strengthen a society’s intellectual defensibility and democratic founda-
tion.  
- Secondly, there is what the OECD Frascati manual describes as fun-
damental strategic research. This definition refers to pure research, 
which is, nevertheless, directed towards problems that have been se-
lected by policymakers as deserving high priority because of their po-
litical or societal saliency. This often occurs in the case of scarce re-
sources (such as the setting of research priorities in developing or other 
economically less advantaged countries), or when there is strong politi-
cal pressure for ‘relevant’ research) to be done.  
An example of the latter is the European Commission’s allocation of 
the research funding in the first six 5-year Framework Programmes. 
Most of the FP-supported research was ‘targeted’ research; it always 
had to fall within the chosen priority fields. Only the seventh Frame-
Article in: ALLEA Annual Report 2007 (pp.23-41). Amsterdam: ALLEA.
 30 
work Programme (to be commenced in 2007), which introduces the 
European Research Council (ERC), allows a modest part of the funds 
to be allocated to science-driven, cutting-edge research without a fur-
ther prioritising of themes or subject areas.  
- Thirdly, there is practicable, science-driven research. As the wording 
indicates, one is again concerned with science-driven research, but in 
this case, with research whose results will sooner or later (in a great 
many cases rather later) lead to important applications or innovations in 
the practical professional field. Many disciplines provide striking ex-
amples of theoretical work’s practical ‘usefulness’, although, as men-
tioned, it often took considerable time for some discoveries to reach the 
practical application stage. Maxwell’s groundwork on the transmission 
of electronic waves, resulting in Marconi’s telegraph some decades 
later; the development of the early fundamental Radon theory that lead 
to the later computer topography; 1920s polymer chemistry resulting in 
a booming plastic industry from the 40s onward; fundamental physio-
logical research that lead to significant and innovative pharmaceutical 
remedies; the invention of the transistor principle finding its use in the 
semiconductor area, and – a striking recent example - a few CERN 
physicists developing a device with which to exchange large data files, 
thus sowing the seeds of the World Wide Web and bringing about the 
information and communication branch’s enormous prosperity …. they 
are all significant cases in point. By the way, this has been an important 
argument for many European research organisations, including All 
European Academies ( see ALLEA, 2005) in respect of defending and 
promoting basic research in European research programmes. Europe’s 
economic and social future depends on the careful development and 
exploitation and, in particular, innovation of its knowledge base. Inno-
vation in a knowledge economy requires new knowledge, and this new 
knowledge is specifically generated by cutting-edge, science-driven 
research. 
It is not difficult to identify a great number of theoretical contribu-
tions to the social sciences that were eventually translated into prolific 
applications. A few are the importance of learning theory for the ad-
vancement of didactic and educational practices, the use of experimen-
tal research on perception and attention for ergonomic applications in 
industry, traffic and marketing, the contribution of theoretical work in 
decision theory and risk analysis to industrial and governmental deci-
sions, the usefulness of economic modelling for monetary policies, and 
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that of the fundamental work on stereotyping and prejudice for dealing 
with minorities and migrants. These examples can easily be supple-
mented with numerous others. The point is that the researcher’s pri-
mary intention is not the development of an instrument or the solution 
of a practical problem, but the advancement and augmentation of the 
knowledge of social behaviour through empirical and theoretical analy-
sis. At the same time, this knowledge is utilised by the researcher 
him/herself or others at a later stage, and converted into practical appli-
cations.  
- Fourthly, we can identify problem-driven / product-oriented research. 
The motivating force behind this type of research is not primarily theo-
retical interest or scientific curiosity, but the need to solve a practical 
problem or to develop a useful product. This type of research is usually 
referred to as ‘applied research’.  
Various types of ‘applied research’ fall within this category, inclu-
ding:  
- instrumental research oriented towards the development of instru-
ments (for diagnosis, analysis, assessment);  
- research aimed at the manufacture of products (drugs, tools, ser-
vices); 
- research on intervention methods for individuals or groups (devel-
opment and evaluation of psychotherapy, organisational develop-
ment, conflict prevention, community building);  
- research on (the optimisation of) procedures and processes (deci-
sion making, sales, social cohesion). 
 
I would like to make two observations with respect to this category of 
research. First a methodological one: although both the origin and the 
objective of this type of research may stem from the need to solve a 
practical problem or to produce a useful method or instrument, instead 
of theoretical curiosity, there is nothing reprehensible about the re-
search process itself. It follows the same rules and standards as basic 
research: questions are posed and the design is planned in an unbiased 
way, hypotheses are tested with objective data, the analysis and inter-
pretation is ‘value free’ in the sense that no interests, power or external 
(e.g. financial) pressures should play a role. Standards are explicitness, 
testability, and replicability. 
Secondly, applied research could also lead to generalisable laws and 
relationships, and therefore contribute to the augmentation of the scien-
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tific knowledge. In fact, a great deal of what is now known about 
causes of individual behaviour or social processes is the product of ap-
plied research in behavioural, societal or economic science.  
In other words, in principle there is nothing inferior about applied 
science, neither in terms of quality and methods, nor in terms of its con-
tribution to the body of knowledge. Only its origin and its goal are dif-
ferent: it is problem induced and solution oriented. 
- Fifthly, there is auxiliary research, research that is meant to be sup-
portive in respect of policy and decision-making. The contribution can 
be solicited in different phases of decision-making. In the first phase, 
the initiating phase, research may generate or help to identify the prob-
lem that needs attention. Survey research may reveal citizens’ dissatis-
faction, dangerous or risky procedures or rules, discrimination or injus-
tice in the treatment of citizens, unsatisfactory working or living condi-
tions, and the like. This may contribute to properly defining the ques-
tion to be addressed. In the second phase, the search for alternatives, 
research may help to ascertain various options under consideration’s 
chances of success and unwanted side effects. In the third phase, the 
finalisation, the researcher may assist the decision maker by calculating 
possible amendments’ or adaptations’ effects by using a research-based 
simulation model, or a computer support system that can easily incor-
porate parameters changes. In the fourth phase, in which the implemen-
tation takes place, the researcher may assist by, for example, identify-
ing possible causes for resistance to change, as well as by providing an 
evaluation and follow-up studies. 
The social scientist working in this context can still be operating 
within the boundaries of scientific activities based on finding the truth. 
Although auxiliary researchers as described above could be tempted to 
select biased information and agreeable alternatives, it helps the deci-
sion maker more by providing objective and correct rather than pleas-
ing information. It is my firm belief that if (applied) scientists start to 
compromise the truth, if research becomes politicised and the norms of 
veracity are infringed, their input will lose its independent contribution, 
and will eventually become useless. 
The danger of violating the truth is even greater in another form of 
auxiliary research, namely when research results are solicited as am-
munition for a discussion or a political debate, whether to attack or de-
fend a certain position, or to create negative or positive attitudes with 
respect to certain ideas or proposals. I presume that social scientists 
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working for political parties, or for a national or local government find 
this picture familiar. It is clear that the researcher should be very care-
ful here. Veracity is all too often replaced by opportunism and expedi-
ency. Moreover, arguments brought in by scientists could start leading 
a life of their own. They may be used by the client, but also by opposed 
groups, activists and other interested parties. Biased and misleading 
interpretations, generalisations, and selective use are more the rule than 
the exception. It is often impossible to get the genie back into the bottle 
again. 
In this overview we have tried to show that within the borders of 
‘truthfulness’ there is a variety of types of research in which practical 
relevance and usefulness may play a role during or after the research 
process itself. It has also become clear that the simple dichotomy ‘pure 
versus applied’ research does not suffice when describing the complex 
reality of scientific work. 
 
 
Why under-utilisation? 
 
If the social sciences have such a strong affiliation with social policy 
and if the knowledge of the dynamics of human behaviour and its inter-
action with the social environment is so important for growth and inno-
vation, then an interesting thought thrusts itself upon us: Why is it that 
social sciences are not fully used, why do governments and industrial 
leaders so often neglect or disregard the findings and insights rendered 
by social science research? Why do political or industrial decision 
makers not request assistance from social sciences in the many in-
stances when this would be expedient? Even in research funding the 
social sciences find themselves in the lower priority area (Drenth, 1996; 
EC, 2005a, 2005c). Of course, under-utilisation is a general complaint 
of scientists – and that is why many of the following reasons for such 
underutilisation do apply in a great many other disciplines of science as 
well - but it is especially the social science that seem to suffer from this 
negligence. What are the causes of or reasons for this disregard, in par-
ticular of the social sciences?  
In the first place, ignorance. Obviously, the fruits of social scien-
tists’ meticulous research work insufficiently filters through to decision 
makers in the general public. Yes, the latter do acknowledge that ‘psy-
chological and social factors’ are important and that one should not 
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forget about the importance of people’s behaviour and the social condi-
tions, but mostly this is the social ‘science’ of popular magazines, best-
sellers and gurus. As incisively described by Pfeffer and Sutton (2006), 
this is often a mixture of hard facts, dangerous half-truths and total 
nonsense. Only the application of ‘evidence based’ social science will 
bear fruits.  
Secondly, confusion. Even a supportive reader of social science re-
search repeatedly runs into inconsistent and even contradictory results: 
Does participation lead to better decision-making or not? Does violence 
on television lead to more or less aggressive behaviour? Do satisfied 
workers perform better or worse? Should school classes be heterogene-
ous or homogeneous? Does lower unemployment lead to inflation or 
not? Does national pressure for assimilation of minorities lead to inte-
gration or to segregation? There are almost always research results 
available to support either point of view. We know, of course, that such 
differences can often be explained in terms of different samples, cir-
cumstances, instruments, or even a divergent research design. We also 
know that, certainly in the social and behavioural sciences, much of our 
scientific knowledge has an uncertain and probabilistic character and 
that solid, indisputable truths are seldom found. Fact of the matter is 
that incompatible and inconclusive research results often motivate the 
negation of these results. 
Thirdly, part of the reluctance to use social science knowledge is 
caused by an anti-science attitude that has unfortunately gained influ-
ence lately (see also Drenth, 2003). These days we unfortunately all too 
often see facts being exchanged for dogmas, logic and reasoning for 
populist opportunism, and scientific findings for religious prejudice. 
The wide-spread public appreciation of science and its achievements 
that was evident until the middle of the 20th century has been replaced 
by doubts, scepticism and even enmity. The media, in which respect 
and admiration for science used to be predominant, now often express 
misgivings, criticism and disillusionment. It is likely that also those 
who should take social science knowledge into account in their daily 
work and decision making are affected by this anti-science sentiment, 
and turn away from evidence-based science. 
And even if it is not a question of anti-science sentiments, many in-
dividuals, including industrial and governmental decision makers, re-
veal an unfortunate aversion to scientific and logical argumentation, 
and are inclined to accept all sorts of illogical views and claims. This is 
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a dangerous development in our society as has been pointed out elo-
quently by Taverne (2005) in his book “The March of Unreason”. In 
this respect, Dawes (2001) has made an interesting distinction. Lack of 
sustaining evidence, evidence supporting the opposite view, or even 
outright contradictions are only important for people who (like to) think 
coherently and rationally, which takes time and effort. Unfortunately, 
many people think in the intuitive mode, which is swift, effortless and 
associative. This is then further reinforced by five of the “seven sins of 
memory” (Schacter, 2001): transience (forgetting things), misattribu-
tion (mixing aspects of memory), suggestibility, bias and persistency 
(perseverant memories of traumatic events). Dawes believes in educat-
ing people to become more rational thinkers, and hopes to fend off this 
intuitive mode. 
Fourthly, there is, of course, unwillingness. People do not want to 
give up their spouse theories and beliefs. People do not want to believe 
that common sense is not always a valid judgement measure, that 
handwriting does not reveal personality characteristics, that people are 
not always driven by financial incentives, that surveys often conceal the 
truth. People do not want to give up their prejudices, their ethnic, geo-
graphic or gender stereotypes. Sometimes this unwillingness to accept 
scientific truths is prompted by the fact that these truths are politically 
incorrect or unwelcome. Our own finding that the Chinese pupils in 
schools on Java had the highest average scores in almost all intelligence 
tests was not welcomed by Indonesian officials. The conclusion that 
violence and criminal behaviour are significantly higher among second-
generation Dutch Moroccan immigrants than in other immigrant groups 
and in the native population is a sensitive matter. Similarly, findings 
regarding gender or ethnic difference have been contested for being 
politically incorrect.. 
In the fifth place, there is distrust. Decision makers often have ex-
perience of being put on the wrong track by so-called experts who sold 
unwarranted certainty, communicated ‘probabilistic’ knowledge as if 
this were solid conclusions, offered valid explanations when hypotheti-
cal interpretations would have been appropriate, or who suggested that 
their conclusions were based on empirical evidence when this was un-
satisfactory or even lacking. It is no wonder that decision makers often 
regard such ‘misleading’ scientific advice with suspicion and distrust.  
Distrust also stems from social science advisors who do not make 
sufficient distinction between research results and their personal opin-
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ions and normative views. Time and again, on the television or in 
newspaper interviews, we have professors of psychology or sociology 
presenting moral, pragmatic or political opinions instead of discussing 
scientific analyses or evidence-based conclusions. Of course, every 
citizen has the right to have and to present his own opinion, or to en-
gage in political advocacy, but the point here is that this should be done 
in his personal capacity, and not in the name of science. In the latter 
case, social scientists lose their credibility as independent analysts, and 
are regarded as just another interest group. 
Distrust may also be caused by another phenomenon: the general 
concern and doubts regarding the moral and ethical consequences of 
fast-developing science and technology. This was also revealed by a 
European survey of attitudes and opinions in which many people even 
express fear of scientists whose great knowledge could make them too 
powerful, and whose research could cross ethical boundaries, all of 
which is difficult to control (Eurobarometer, 2005). Interestingly 
enough, it is not ignorance that should be blamed. There is a zero-
correlation between knowledge of and (dis)trust in science. 
In the sixth place, we mention disappointment. Many politicians and 
managers in industry or government complain that social scientists do 
not provide answers to the real questions with which they are con-
fronted. Fragmented and detailed laboratory studies are not regarded as 
making sufficient contributions to the understanding and handling of 
decision makers’ complex and multifaceted reality. A strictly positivis-
tic, quantitative tradition may be unsuitable to provide insight into the 
concrete contextual complexity of organisational or governmental deci-
sions and strategy. Elsewhere (Drenth & Heller, 2004), we have argued 
that multi-method approaches, including qualitative and descriptive 
analyses, and the involvement of multidisciplinary teams, are necessary 
to address the compounded problems of modern organisations’ strate-
gies and courses of action. Such a renewed and successful approach 
would have to include a transdisciplinary orientation. 
Finally, there is deception. This is particularly found in behavioural 
sciences, that deal with well being and mental health of people. Bona 
fide psychologists have to compete with all kinds of pseudo-scientific 
‘experts’ who offer a range of furbished nonsense, which, however, 
often tallies well with intuitive prejudices (Drenth, 2003). Particularly 
in the field of individual or group counselling, organizational change 
and revival, and psychotherapy and healing, lots of pseudo-scientific 
Article in: ALLEA Annual Report 2007 (pp.23-41). Amsterdam: ALLEA.
 37 
allurements can be found, ranging from hypnosis to neuro-emotional 
integration, from reincarnation therapy to healing by prayer, from sci-
entology to neuro-linguistic programming (NLP). As said, in spite of 
much contra-evidence, the popularity of this pseudo-scientific moon-
shine is alarmingly high. In addition to a shrewd commercial formula 
and marketing, there is also a flirtation with science (impressive names, 
such as neuro-linguistic programming, ‘scientific’ books, masters de-
grees and diplomas) that lead innocent citizens up the garden path. 
How can the general public separate the wheat from the chaff? 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
By way of conclusion, we will make some recommendations for the 
social sciences. 
(1) Recognise the whole spectrum from pure to applied social science. 
Recognise the specific goals and criteria of each of the different re-
search forms on this spectrum, and therefore their specific charac-
teristics and added value. Acknowledge the limitations of all spe-
cific methodological choices, and accept the need for a broader as 
well as more interdisciplinary approach at times to tackle the whole 
range of relevant social issues in present-day society.  
(2) Ensure that the communication of research results is honest and 
fair. Do not focus too emphatically on the implementations for pol-
icy and practice, if unwarranted. Empirical evidence should be the 
only basis of conclusions, and with that a distinction should be 
made between reasonable certainties, probabilistic knowledge and 
educated guesses. Make a clear difference between scientific con-
clusions and personal beliefs and attitudes. 
(3) Ensure that in concrete cases the social science knowledge, based 
on general laws and relationships, is contextualised. Within social 
sciences almost all generic laws and patterns are contingent upon a 
host of contextual variables. One of the most pertinent examples of 
the latter is culture. It is fair to say that in our multi-cultural world, 
the cultural contextualisation of models is almost a prerequisite. 
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(4) Social scientists should develop the skills to use various types of 
media to communicate their findings to policy-makers and to the 
general public. They should also participate in public debate. We 
agree with a recent ESF report which states (ESF, 2003) “Given 
that the public sector is the principal sponsor of research there is an 
increasing onus on all of us to devote more time to explaining, lis-
tening and debating.” 
(5) Social scientists should not evade moral and ethical issues that al-
most inevitably arise out of their research. Research-related ethical 
issues should be given full attention, including: 
 (a) justification of the choice of study: is it worth pursuing, and is it 
not in conflict with basic human values: human rights, human dig-
nity, equality and non-discrimination, 
 (b) the nature of the data gathering or experimentation: informed 
consent, no unacceptable damage inflicted on the object of research 
(people, animals, environment, organisations),  
 (c) responsibility taken for what is done with the results of the stu-
dy, either by the researcher or by others (for a more elaborate cov-
erage of this subject see Drenth, 2006). 
(6) Take a firm line with and endorse stringent regulations against 
pseudo-scientific movements and practices. A tolerant attitude, so 
typical of social and behavioural scientists, is not an appropriate 
method in this case. Quacks and swindlers deceive people, injure 
the general welfare, and encourage irrationality in society. And, in 
agreement with Dawes (2001), I believe that the world would be a 
better place if people made an effort to think rationally and to rea-
son coherently. 
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